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Criminal Investigation and Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws in the Health Care Field
Toby G. Singer*
Helen-Louise Hunter**
One of the most significant of the many developments contribut-
ing to the revolution in the health care field in the past ten years is
the federal government's decision to prosecute health care profes-
sionals criminally for alleged violations of the antitrust laws. Al-
most unthinkable ten years ago, hospitals and physicians now face
the new-and very real-prospect of criminal investigation and
prosecution for activities that are recognized as per se violations of
the antitrust laws and for which other businesses and business
people have long been convicted.1
Over the years the seemingly different treatment of health care
professionals led to a perhaps understandable but now misplaced
confidence that health care providers were somehow immune from
criminal prosecution. That belief has now been convincingly shat-
tered. Not only is it unmistakably clear that the antitrust laws ap-
ply to health care professionals, like any other professional or
nonprofessional engaged in business, 2 but the government demon-
* Toby G. Singer is a partner in the Washington office of Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue and was formerly Deputy Assistant Director for Health Care at the Federal Trade
Commission. She received her bachelor of arts from Wesleyan University (1974) and her
juris doctor from Georgetown University Law Center (1977).
** Helen-Louise Hunter is an associate in the Washington office of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue. She received her bachelor of arts from Bryn Mawr College (1956), her
masters of arts from Yale University (1958), and her juris doctor from Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center (1986).
1. Agreements among competitors to fix prices, allocate markets, and/or engage in
group boycotts are per se violations of the antitrust laws. The government does not need
to prove an anticompetitive intent or effect in such cases, as it must in other antitrust
cases, because the anticompetitive effect of these practices has been so well established in
case law. These activities have long been considered the most egregious type of antitrust
violation and have been prosecuted criminally in most industries, although not in the
health care field until recently.
2. In three major decisions, the Supreme Court held unequivocally that professional
activities are not exempt from the antitrust laws or from per se scrutiny. See Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945))
("the nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sher-
man Act").
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strated that it will, at its discretion, enforce the antitrust laws crim-
inally as well as civilly against health care and non-health care
violators alike.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that the health care industry
became a major focus of the antitrust enforcement agencies during
the 1980s and early 1990s. By the 1980s, health care became the
number one industry in the United States. Moreover, it was an
industry undergoing profound change-a belated industrial revolu-
tion of its own. Lasers, MRIs, fiber-optic devices, and other expen-
sive medical equipment revolutionized medical diagnosis and
treatment but increased the cost of medical care enormously. At
the same time, the introduction of new managed care concepts
brought basic organizational change. In short, the health care in-
dustry was being transformed from a cottage industry of independ-
ent physicians and hospitals providing customized service into a
more sophisticated industry of HMOs, PPOs, and national health
care systems.
One could have predicted that with these revolutionary changes
would come new antitrust concerns, because antitrust and big busi-
ness go hand-in-hand. Yet, few in the medical community were
prepared for the antitrust implications of the changes that were
taking place. Typically inexperienced in business management and
largely untutored in the antitrust laws, health care providers sud-
denly found themselves confronted with complex legal issues that
they would hardly have contemplated a decade before. Faced with
threatening new forms of competition in a managed care environ-
ment quite unlike the fee-for-service world they were accustomed
to, they were naturally drawn toward new collaborative ventures
that appeared to offer competitive advantages in pooling resources
and in reducing unnecessary duplication of services. Most of these
ventures were procompetitive, but some may have had anticompe-
titive effects that the providers did not recognize as potential
problems under the antitrust laws.
BACKGROUND
The Sherman Antitrust Act is both a civil and criminal statute.
However, the language of the Act provides no criteria for deter-
mining whether a particular violation should properly be addressed
by a criminal indictment or by a civil complaint. The Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice ("Department") and private
parties brought many civil actions under the Act in various indus-
tries, and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") brought numer-
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ous civil actions under the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
contains prohibitions similar to those enumerated in the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
The Department, which alone has authority to bring a criminal
antitrust case, prosecuted many cases criminally as well. It won
criminal convictions for price-fixing, bid-rigging, and the unlawful
division of markets and allocation of customers in a host of differ-
ent industries, including the real estate, soft drink, milk, retail gas-
oline, steel drum, home-heating oil, and wholesale grocery
industries. In the nine-month period from July of 1992 through
March of 1993, the Department filed over one hundred criminal
cases, including related obstruction of justice and perjury cases,
against eighty-six corporations and eighty-four individuals. 3 Prior
to 1990, the Department had brought only two criminal indict-
ments, one against an association of medical professionals4 and one
against a pharmaceutical association.5 Aside from these two cases,
the Department relied solely on civil enforcement of the antitrust
laws in the health care field.6
In deciding whether to prosecute a case criminally or civilly, the
Department has had a long-standing policy of seeking criminal in-
dictments "only where it believes it can prove a clear, purposeful
violation of the law." 7 The vast majority of cases prosecuted crimi-
3. The Justice Department's major priorities have been the investigation and prosecu-
tion of bid-rigging and price-fixing on contracts let by the United States Department of
Defense. The cases have involved a wide range of products and services, including power
grid tubes, frozen seafood, milk and dairy products, and dam repair products. 35 individ-
uals who have been sentenced to jail have received sentences averaging 288 days, and the
Department has recovered $13.4 million in civil damages. At the present time, there are
19 grand juries in 12 states investigating antitrust matters involving defense procurement
and another 32 grand juries in 21 states investigating bid rigging in the milk industry.
Acting Assistant Attorney General John W. Clark, Antitrust Division, "60 Minutes with
the Acting Assistant Attorney General," Remarks at the American Bar Association's
41st Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting (Apr. 2, 1993).
4. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (criminal convic-
tion of the AMA for conspiracy to obstruct the operation of Group Health Association,
one of the first HMOs in the country).
5. Northern Calif. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.)
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962) (criminal conviction for price fixing).
6. Following the federal government's lead, the state of Arizona brought civil anti-
trust charges against two county medical societies in Arizona alleged to have conspired to
fix the price of medical services in the late 1970s. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Today, the federal government might well bring criminal
antitrust charges against the medical societies in Maricopa County. However, in 1979,
when the case was originally brought, the antitrust laws had only recently been held to
apply to professionals. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
7. See Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield, Antitrust Division, Remarks
at the Federal Bar Association, Cleveland Chapter (Apr. 18, 1979).
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nally involved per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act: com-
petitors are alleged to have entered into an agreement or
conspiracy to fix prices, rig bids, divide the market, or allocate
customers.
PENALTIES
The government's decision to proceed civilly or criminally obvi-
ously has profound consequences for an antitrust defendant. In a
civil complaint, defendants typically face the prospect of being per-
manently enjoined from engaging in prohibited activities, although
they also can be required to divest assets or dissolve associations.
Defendants are potentially liable for civil penalties of up to $10,000
for each violation,8 treble damages suffered by the United States as
a purchaser of goods9 and, in some cases, may be required to repay
consumers injured by certain antitrust violations. '
A criminal violation of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, is a
felonyI l for which a corporation may be fined up to $10 million; an
individual may be fined up to $350,000, or imprisoned for up to
three years, or both. 12 Under the Criminal Fines Improvement
Act of 1984, the fine may be even higher under the "double loss/
double gain" provision, which permits a fine of up to double the
gross amount gained by a defendant or lost by the victim.' 3 Under
the United States Sentencing Commission's new Sentencing Guide-
lines, organizational offenses may be punished by fines ranging
from fifteen to eighty percent of a firm's volume of affected com-
merce. 14 The new statutory maximum fine means that courts can
impose the full range of monetary penalties recommended by the
Commission.
The Sentencing Commission also raised the individual offense
levels so that jail time will almost invariably result. Under the
1991 Guidelines, the minimum sentence for each violation is four
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1), 45(m) (1988).
9. Id. at § 15(a) (1988), as amended by the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-588. Prior to the 1990 Act, the United States could recover only actual dam-
ages. Id. at § 15(b). Foreign governments in their capacity as purchasers may also re-
cover damages, but only actual damages.
10. Id. at § 57b(b) (1988). The court is empowered to order a broad array of reme-
dial measures, including rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution in the form of
money refunds, the return of property, and contractual damages.
11. Id. at § 1, 2 (1988).
12. Id. at § 1.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1988).
14. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1
(Nov. 1991).
[Vol. 2
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to ten months.'5 In addition, those found guilty of a criminal vio-
lation may have their licenses revoked by the state and may be
debarred from federal programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and
CHAMPUS (military coverage). In addition to the expense and
turmoil of a grand jury investigation and criminal trial, a criminal
conviction carries a stigma that is often far more devastating than
the fine or term of imprisonment imposed. Since a criminal con-
viction is prima facie evidence of liability in a subsequent civil suit
by injured parties seeking treble damages (plus attorney fees), there
is also the prospect of civil damages on top of the devastating crim-
inal penalties.
RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD
The Justice Department, which views criminal antitrust viola-
tions as a serious form of white collar crime, will conduct prompt,
aggressive investigations and seek to impose stiff fines and jail
sentences under the federal sentencing guidelines. In the late
1980s, senior officials in the Antitrust Division ("Division") began
to warn of possible criminal prosecution of health care providers
who committed per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act by
acting together to fix prices, boycott certain buyers or sellers, or
divide the market by allocating patients or service area. 6 Officials
in the Division gave more than forty speeches in 1989-92 to "edu-
cate the health care industry in making it abundantly clear that the
Division will not hesitate to file criminal cases where health care
providers commit per se violations."' 7
The Division launched three grand jury investigations of physi-
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Assistant Attorney General Charles Rule, Remarks at the Annual Meet-
ing of the American Medical Association (Dec. 6, 1988); Chief Robert E. Bloch, Profes-
sions and Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
"Antitrust Enforcement and Health Care: On the Cutting Edge," Remarks at the Na-
tional Health Lawyers Association (Jan. 27, 1989). See also Robert E. Bloch, "Antitrust
Enforcement and Health Care: Current Developments and Future Trends," Remarks at
the Twenty-Third Annual New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 4, 1989); Assistant
Attorney General James F. Rill, Antitrust Division, "Antitrust Enforcement Policy and
the Treatment of Horizontal Price Restraints: Lessons for the Health Care Industry,"
Remarks at the National Health Lawyers Association (Feb. 15, 1991); Assistant Chief
Gail Kursh, Professions and Intellectual Property Section, "Antitrust in the Health Care
Field, A Report from the Department of Justice," Remarks at the Northern California
HFMA Conferences (Sept. 23, 1992).
17. Chief Robert E. Bloch, Professions and Intellectual Property Section, Depart-
ment of Justice, Antitrust Division, and Jessica N. Cohen, Trial Attorney, Antitrust Divi-
sion, "Criminal Prosecution of Health Care Providers Upheld in United States v.
Alston," Remarks at the National Health Lawyers Association (Feb. 19, 1993).
1993]
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cians and dentists in 1988. The first investigation resulted in a civil
complaint, rather than a criminal indictment, against twenty-two
obstetricians and gynecologists in Savannah, Georgia who alleg-
edly exchanged fee information, resulting in higher fees for their
services. Without admitting liability, the physicians agreed to a
civil consent decree issued simultaneously with the complaint,
which prohibited them from engaging in the conduct in question.'"
The second grand jury investigation was of the Massachusetts
Allergy Society and some of its individual members for allegedly
agreeing on fees to be charged an HMO. As with the Savannah
obstetricians and gynecologists, the Division ultimately decided to
file a civil suit rather than proceed criminally, and the parties si-
multaneously entered into a consent order.19
The third investigation produced a much more startling result:
the criminal indictment and subsequent conviction of three dentists
and two of their professional corporations in Tucson, Arizona, the
first criminal indictment of a health care professional in almost
20thirty years.
This indictment, in United States v. Alston, charged the three
dentists with conspiring to fix and raise the copayment fees that
members of four independent prepaid dental insurance plans were
required to pay to the defendants and other dentists. The govern-
ment alleged that, led by the three individual dentists, more than
thirty dentists had sent identical letters to each of the plans for
which they provided services. The form letters defended an in-
crease in copayment fees and attached a new copayment schedule,
which was twenty-five to thirty percent higher than previous ones.
James F. Rill, then Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division, described the dentists' actions as follows:
This was not a situation where a panel of providers who were
part of a legitimate PPO engaged in fee negotiations with third-
party payers. Instead, the independent dentists banded together
for purposes of forcing a fee hike among the competing plans.
Three of the plans did indeed raise copayment rates, and those
higher rates are still in effect. The fourth called the federal
government.
18. United States v. Burgstiner, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,422 (S.D. Ga. 1991)
(consent decree).
19. United States v. Massachusetts Allergy Soc'y, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,846 (D. Mass. 1992) (consent decree).
20. United States v. Alston, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,366 (D. Ariz. 1990), ajrd
in part, vacated in part, United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Alston, No. CR-10-042-Tuc (D.C. Ariz., Jan. 15, 1993) (plea agreement).
[Vol. 2
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There was never any argument made that defendants' conduct
related to any form of efficiency-enhancing economic integration
or that it resulted in the introduction of a new product into the
market. With no economic integration and no new product,
what we had was a garden variety price-fix, a per se illegal
offense.21
Robert Bloch and Jessica Cohen, who prosecuted the case for the
government, expressed a similar view of the case:
Alston involved nothing more than garden-variety price fixing:
competitors who banded together to agree on increased copay-
ment fees and demand that the plans adhere to them. In this
fundamental respect, the conduct in Alston is no different from
agreements among competitors to fix real estate commissions,
soft drink prices, or retail gasoline prices. The Government has
prosecuted all of these activities criminally.22
In 1990, a jury convicted the dentists and their professional cor-
porations of antitrust violations. It was the first conviction of a
health care practitioner in a criminal antitrust case in fifty years
and only the second conviction ever. Subsequently, the United
States District Court granted Dr. Alston's motion for a new trial
and granted the two other defendants' motions for acquittal on the
grounds that the jury instructions were deficient and the evidence
was insufficient to support the conviction.23 The Department of
Justice appealed.
In December of 1992, the Ninth Circuit announced its long-
awaited decision.24 It agreed with the district court that although
the jury instructions were "technically and legally correct," they
were too vague to support Alston's criminal convictions. The
Ninth Circuit ordered a new trial for Alston but reversed the dis-
trict judge's acquittal of the other two dentists, holding that the
government made its case: "it was not irrational for the jury to
conclude" "that defendants knowingly participated in an agree-
ment to raise co-payment fees."' 25 The case was remanded to the
district court for further criminal proceedings against all three
defendants.
The final chapter in the Alston case concluded in January of
1993, when Dr. Alston's corporation entered a plea of nolo con-
tendere to the felony indictment, agreeing to pay a $5,000 fine and
21. Rill, supra note 16.
22. Bloch and Cohen, supra note 17.
23. 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,366.
24. 974 F.2d 1206.
25. Id. at 1211.
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perform 250 hours of community service, which would be per-
formed by Dr. Alston on behalf of the corporation. All charges
against the three individual dentists were dropped.26 While the
Justice Department considers the Ninth Circuit's decision in the
case a "significant legal victory that reaffirmed the soundness of the
Government's legal theory," 27 the Department apparently was not
willing to re-try the case before the trial judge who previously en-
tered verdicts against the government.
The Court of Appeal's decision in Alston has already sparked a
debate over the wisdom of the government's decision to prosecute
Dr. Alston criminally. Although the court endorsed the govern-
ment's view that the health care industry is neither exempt from
the antitrust laws nor entitled to special treatment under those
laws, s it referred to the government's decision to indict the Tucson
dentists as "elevating to the criminal level a dispute normally han-
dled as a civil enforcement matter . ".. 29 The court's expression
of concern about the "crushing consequences of a criminal convic-
tion on the lives and careers" of the individuals "singled out for
such treatment"30 is now being cited by those who argue that crim-
inal antitrust prosecutions should be reserved for conduct that is
clearly anticompetitive and that defendants knew to be wrong.
A more recent investigation of generic drug manufacturers in
Baltimore resulted in the second indictment in the health care field
since 1990. The government charged two drug companies and
their presidents with conspiracy to fix drug prices.3' One of the
executives pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty-one months in
jail, plus a fine. The other defendant will be tried later this year.
In mid-1990, the government initiated another grand jury probe
into an alleged price-fixing scheme by Pediatric Faculty Physi-
cians, a group of approximately ninety pediatricians in Salt Lake
City who practice at both the University of Utah Hospital and the
26. D.C. Ariz. No. CR-10-042-Tuc (D.C. Ariz., Jan. 15, 1993).
27. See Bloch and Cohen, supra note 17.
28. Applying a string of cases from the American Medical Association case in 1943
(America Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943)) to the Indiana Federation
of Dentists case in 1986 (FTC v. Indiana Fed'n Dentists, 476 U.S. 463 (1986)), the Ninth
Circuit ruled that, in antitrust cases, "[h]ealth care providers are exposed to the same
liability and entitled to the same defenses as businesses in other industries." 974 F.2d at
1209. Consequently, the court concluded, "[t]he district court properly allowed the gov-
ernment to proceed on a per se theory" and upheld the jury instructions that price-fixing
is per se illegal. Id.
29. Id. at 1214.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., Crim. No. 92-0454 (D. Md. filed
Dec. 17, 1992).
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Primary Children's Medical Center. The government recently
broadened the scope of the investigation and is now reported to be
looking into an alleged conspiracy between the two hospitals to
divide up the city's pediatric care market. After more than two
years, the investigation still continues; reports indicate that the
University of Utah had spent close to $3 million in legal-defense
fees during the protracted investigation.32 Former Utah Attorney
General Paul Van Dam3 3 and his recently elected successor, Jan
Graham, are reported to be seeking an end to the federal probe,
which continues to cost the University on average $250,000 per
month. 34
The same grand jury is now investigating another antitrust mat-
ter that apparently developed as an offshoot of the original investi-
gation. According to the press, "the focus of the investigation
appears to be whether these and other hospitals in Utah engaged in
criminal price fixing by sharing nurse salary information among
themselves to avoid a nurse salary war."' 35 In July of 1992, the
grand jury reportedly subpoenaed salary information from most, if
not all, of Utah's fifty-four hospitals. The hospitals already found
the first eight months of the probe "extremely expensive. '36
Grand jury investigations are not public, and thus, there may be
other investigations currently under way. Justice Department offi-
cials recently referred to other "criminal investigations of compet-
ing [health care] providers who act jointly through their specialty
society or some other ad hoc group to negotiate higher fees with
third-party payers or otherwise pressure third-party payers to in-
crease reimbursement. ' 37
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HEALTH CARE FIELD
In view of these grand jury investigations and the repeated warn-
ings from highly-placed government officials, hospitals, especially
32. U Makes l1th-Hour Plea for Legal-Defense Fees, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 2,
1993, at B4; Not a Hospital Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 1, 1993, at A10; Mike Carter,
GOP Lawmakers Say U Hospital's Healthy Profits Can Fund Antitrust Probe, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Feb. 27, 1993, at C2.
33. While he was the Attorney General of Utah, Mr. Van Dam also served as head of
the Antitrust Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General.
34. Don Harrie and Jo Ann Jacobsen-Wells, Van Dam, Graham Seek End to Anti-
trust Case, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 14, 1992.
35. See David Burda, Nurse Compensation is New Target of Probe, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Aug. 24, 1992, at 8; Paul Rolly and Jo Ann Jacobsen-Wells, Federal Anti-
trust Probe, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 8, 1992, at Bl.
36. Rolly & Jacobsen-Wells, supra note 35.
37. Bloch, supra note 16.
19931
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those in markets with few competitors, must be careful not to enter
into any agreement, explicit or implicit, that might be construed as
price or wage fixing, market allocation, or a group boycott. For
example, the government may view an agreement between hospi-
tals to eliminate some or all of the duplication in their services as a
per se illegal division of markets, even if the agreement is moti-
vated by the understandable desire to eliminate underutilized serv-
ices in the community and thus reduce costs. FTC Commissioner
Mary Azcuenaga emphasized this point in a recent speech, stating
that "there is a risk of serious criminal antitrust exposure of hospi-
tals in highly concentrated markets that allocate therapeutic or di-
agnostic functions, even though the motive is to secure a higher
rate of utilization and lower costs." ' 38 Hospitals must also be very
careful not to reach any agreement, explicit or implicit, regarding
the prices to be charged for their services or wages to be paid to
their employees, especially nurses. Similarly, an agreement among
competing hospitals not to deal with particular payers could be
viewed as a criminal group boycott.
The message to physicians is equally clear: The government fa-
vors the development of HMOs, PPOs, and other cost-saving man-
aged care programs. Independent physicians who act together to
block or otherwise frustrate the growth of alternative delivery sys-
tems may be charged with a per se violation of the Sherman Act
and exposed to criminal prosecution.39 Physicians' dealings with
and resistance to the demands of third-party payers for discounted
charges pose the greatest risk of antitrust liability. Such joint ac-
tion that is not part of a legitimate joint venture and is designed to
thwart hard bargaining by payers involves serious criminal risk.
Competing physicians face similar dangers when they form and
control their own independent practice association if it does not
truly constitute a legitimate joint venture.
Those who engage in per se illegal conduct of this nature need
not account for a large percent of the market to violate the law.
Nor do they need to be many in number: It takes only two physi-
cians or two hospitals to constitute a conspiracy.
Although there have been only two indictments to date, the
warnings have been issued and additional signs of the govern-
38. Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, Federal Trade Commission, "Hospitals and
Competition Policy," Remarks at the American Protestant Health Association (May 11,
1992).
39. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, "Antitrust in the Health Care Field," Remarks at the National
Health Lawyers Association (Jan 31, 1992).
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ment's planned new offensive are clearly visible in other ongoing
grand jury investigations. There are certain to be other investiga-
tions, which are sure to be costly and personally draining even if
they do not culminate in indictments. Criminal antitrust enforce-
ment, long a priority in other areas, is now a priority in the health
care field as well.
The effects of the recent Congressional increase in antitrust fines
and judicial stiffening of the maximum penalties for persons con-
victed of antitrust crimes are already apparent. An increasing
number of the Department's investigations and cases involve con-
duct that is subject to both the Act and the Guidelines and are
resulting in longer jail terms and higher fines. In a recent case
involving price-fixing by an architectural hardware company, the
court, invoking the "twice the gain or loss" alternative fine provi-
sion,4° fined a corporate defendant $8 million, the largest fine ever
imposed for a single violation of the Sherman Act.41
CONCLUSION
Hospitals, independent physicians, and other health care provid-
ers simply must avoid price agreements, boycotts of third-party
payers, and concerted actions to divide up patients, services, or
service areas that expose them to the risk of criminal liability. Na-
ked restraints of trade that have no purpose other than to increase
the economic leverage of individual competitors through collective
action are per se violations of the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, where there is true economic integration and
a real sharing of risk and profits, joint ventures between hospitals,
physicians, hospitals and physicians, or hospitals and other busi-
nesses can be legal. If antitrust guidelines are followed, health care
providers can engage in collaborative ventures without running
afoul of the antitrust laws, much less the per se violations that
could invite a criminal investigation.
Cooperation between and among hospitals and physicians is cer-
tain to become increasingly important in the future. Indeed, the
government is on record as favoring collaborative efforts, such as
joint investment in ancillary services and/or costly equipment such
as MRIs, helicopters, and lithotripsy machines. 2 Perhaps the best
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
41. Clark, supra note 3.
42. Acting Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, "Regarding Health Care Mergers in the 21st Century," Statement
before the Joint Economic Committee (June 24, 1992).
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evidence of this is that neither the FTC nor the Department of
Justice has brought a single case challenging a legitimate joint ven-
ture in the health care sector involving true economic integration.43
While the government's recent criminal enforcement of the anti-
trust laws in the health care sector is a stern warning to health care
providers to avoid the notorious violations of the antitrust laws
that have long been prosecuted criminally in other sectors of the
economy, it should not be taken as a general alarm against the
dangers of other kinds of collaborative efforts that the government
and others recognize to be in the best interests of the public and
health care providers alike.
The government must be given credit for trying to prepare the
medical community for what lay in store. Yet, the warnings were
not heard throughout the health care industry, and even today,
many health care providers do not fully appreciate the risks of
criminal prosecution.
Future antitrust defendants in the health care industry will no
longer be among the first to be prosecuted criminally. Presumably,
when the courts, antitrust counsel, and health care practitioners
adjust to the changes in the health care field, in which antitrust
issues will play an increasingly important role and criminal prose-
cution of antitrust crimes will not be new, health care professionals
will be in a better position to avoid activities that carry the risk of
criminal prosecution.
43. All of the cases challenging these types of arrangements have been private suits
by aggrieved parties. See, e.g., Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp. 919 F.2d 1550
(11 th Cir. 1990), vacated, rehearing granted, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,040 (11 th
Cir. 1992); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d
139 (4th Cir. 1990); Hassan v. Independent Practice Assoc., P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.
Mich. 1988); Capital Imaging Assoc. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 725 F.
Supp. 669 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing plaintiff's Section 2 claim); Capital Imaging As-
soc. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 791 F. Supp. 956 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (grant-
ing defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Section 1 claim).
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